How to Build Second-Hand Marketplace Platform Like Vinted? Part II: Business Model

When you look at Vinted’s early decisions, one thing becomes clear. The company treated the C2C model as a hard boundary, not a temporary phase. Sellers were individuals cleaning closets, not merchants running catalogs. Prices were low by nature. Transactions were occasional. Any additional barriers showed up immediately in user behavior.
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This built the business model from day one. Vinted did not try to bend users toward marketplace economics. The platform adjusted itself to how people already behaved. Selling had to feel casual. Listing an item had to feel safe. Using the platform had to feel easy.
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This explains why “sell for free” mattered so much. Free listings removed hesitation.
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-> Users posted items without calculating margins or risks.
-> The supply side grew fast, and with it came variety.
-> Variety kept buyers browsing longer.
-> Browsing turned into a habit.
-> Habit created liquidity.
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The same approach was applied to community features. Messaging was not treated as a secondary tool. Profiles and reviews were not cosmetic. These elements helped users feel in control of their interactions. Trust moved from the platform to the network of users themselves. That trust reduced the need for heavy rules and constant intervention.

Phase I (2008–2013): Building Supply Before Revenue

The first phase of Vinted started with a personal problem, not a market thesis. In 2008, Milda Mitkutė was preparing to move and needed a simple way to clean her apartment. She did not look for a business model. She looked for a practical solution. At a party in Vilnius, she shared the idea with software engineer Justas Janauskas. The proposal was to build a website where people could sell or swap clothes they no longer wanted.
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Two weeks later, a basic prototype went live under the name “MadaMada,” which means “my clothes” in Lithuanian. Mitkutė sold forty items in the first week. That early response showed that users already wanted this behavior. The platform only needed to make it visible and easy.
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From the beginning, Vinted applied no fees and no pressure to monetize. Listings were free. Transactions carried no commission.and revenue was not part of the early roadmap. The goal was to fill the platform with items and users. Supply came first because supply created reasons to return.
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Free listings played a central role. Users could post items without thinking about margins or risk. As more items appeared, browsing became more engaging. Buyers stayed longer. Sellers returned to list more. This loop created critical mass on the supply side without paid acquisition.
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Word-of-mouth drove most early traffic inside Lithuania. Users shared listings with friends. They invited others to join. Messaging and direct contact between users helped trust form early.
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Between 2008 and 2013, revenue remained close to zero. A few banner ads helped cover basic server costs, but the platform was not self-sustaining. This was a conscious choice. Vinted used these years to build habit, inventory, and trust.

Phase II (2013–2015): Monetization Mistakes

By 2013, Vinted had solved one problem and exposed another. The open question was how to turn activity into revenue without damaging the behavior that made the marketplace grow.
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Revenue during this phase came from small seller commissions. The model was familiar and borrowed from earlier marketplaces. At low volume, it seemed harmless.

​After securing venture funding in 2013, including a €5 million round led by Accel, the pressure to monetize increased. The company needed a solid proof that the platform could generate income.
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In 2014, Vinted introduced a seller commission tied to its payment system. The fee varied by market. In the United States, it reached 19% of the item price. In Germany, it was around 10% plus a fixed amount per transaction.
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The reaction was immediate and severe. In Germany, users even organized protests. Thousands signed petitions and social media filled with complaints. Activity dropped and traffic in the market fell close to half in a short time.
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This phase nearly stalled growth, but it also clarified what would not work. The business model needed to adapt to user expectations, not the other way around.

Phase III: Business Model Redesign in 2016

By 2016, the limits of the earlier model were clear. Growth stalled. Cash pressure increased. The platform worked, but the economics did not. At that moment, Thomas Plantenga entered the picture.
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Plantenga arrived in Vilnius in May 2016 to assess the situation. He was not new to classifieds or C2C platforms. He had seen similar problems before. After five weeks on the ground, his conclusion was direct. The issue was not marketing. It was not execution. The issue was who Vinted was charging.

The platform was asking sellers to pay. That choice conflicted with how C2C markets behave. Sellers had many alternatives.

The seller commission was removed entirely. In its place, Vinted introduced a buyer protection fee. Buyers paid a small fixed amount, usually between €0.30 and €0.80, plus a variable fee of roughly 3 to 8 % of the item price, depending on the market.

The fee was created around value. It covered secure payments, fraud protection, dispute handling, and refunds. Sellers received the full item price. Buyers paid for safety. The platform earned revenue only when a transaction succeeded.

This change was paired with hard operational decisions. Headcount was cut by more than one third. Overseas offices were closed. Operations were centralized in Vilnius. Market focus narrowed to Germany and France. At the same time, marketing spend increased, including large TV campaigns.

By early 2017, transaction volume rebounded. In one weekend, sales jumped to around $2 million. Over the full year, gross transaction volume reached roughly $360 million. User growth returned, even as the company burned cash during the transition.

As a result, charging buyers aligned with how value was perceived in second-hand transactions. Sellers wanted speed and zero cost. Buyers accepted a small fee in exchange for safety. Vinted later added optional revenue layers without touching the core rule. Sellers could pay for item bumps, wardrobe promotion, or advanced tools. These were optional and situational. The core transaction stayed unchanged.

This phase marked the real inflection point. The platform stopped fighting user behavior and started building around it. The business model finally matched how people actually used the marketplace.

Current Revenue Streams

Once the buyer-side fee stabilized the core economics, Vinted shifted into a more focused phase of monetization. The company did not rush to add new revenue lines. Instead, it focused on protecting the behavior that made the marketplace liquid in the first place.
Selling stayed free by default. Any form of monetization had to be optional, reversible, and clearly tied to user intent.

Moreover, Vinted introduced paid tools that improved visibility without changing the rules of the marketplace.

Item bumps

Item bumps were the simplest expression of this idea. For a small, one-time fee, usually between $0.95 and $2.95 depending on the market, a seller could push a listing to the top of search results and feeds for three days.

Wardrobe spotlight followed the same logic at a larger scale. Instead of promoting a single item, this feature highlighted an entire seller profile for a fixed period, often seven days. In the UK, the price hovered around £6.95 per week. For sellers with multiple listings, this worked like short-term advertising, increasing discovery across their full catalog without locking them into long commitments.

As some users began selling at higher volumes, Vinted introduced subscription-based tools. Vinted Pro bundled advanced features such as analytics, bulk uploads, and permanent profile promotion for a monthly fee of around $9.95. This created recurring revenue while serving a narrow group of users whose needs resembled small businesses rather than casual sellers. Importantly, these tools remained optional and geographically limited, which prevented them from reshaping the core C2C experience.

Ads and Promotion

Vinted avoided traditional banner ads and aggressive placements. Sponsored listings appeared natively in the feed and were designed to resemble organic content. Most promotions came from fashion brands or retail partners and were limited in volume. In parallel, affiliate partnerships allowed Vinted to earn commissions when users clicked promoted offers and completed purchases outside the platform. Traffic was monetized, but the marketplace did not feel like an ad surface.

Together, these elements formed a layered revenue engine. Buyers paid small fees for protection and peace of mind. Sellers paid only when they wanted speed or scale. Everyone else used the platform for free. This balance proved durable. By 2024, Vinted reported €813.4 million in annual revenue, a 36 percent increase year over year. The company projected revenue above €1 billion in 2025, supported by more than €10 billion in annual GMV.

Vinted's User Acquisition Strategy

Vinted’s growth from a small Lithuanian website into a pan-European marketplace did not start with a marketing plan. It started with people. From the beginning, user acquisition followed community behavior rather than classic growth playbooks.

Organic Beginnings in 2008–2012

In the early years, there was no acquisition strategy in the formal sense. Vinted started as a side project. After launching the first version, they did not buy ads or run campaigns in Lithuania. Users found the platform because the idea matched a real need. Young people wanted to clear wardrobes and earn small amounts of cash. The platform gave them a simple way to do it.

Growth came through word of mouth. Friends invited friends. In 2008, one of Janauskas’s couch-surfing guests, a woman from Munich, became an early fan. She later helped launch the platform in Germany under the local brand name “Kleiderkreisel.” There was no headquarters-driven rollout.

The same pattern repeated elsewhere. Users from other countries reached out and asked to bring the platform to their markets. By 2011, the Czech version launched in a similar grassroots way and quickly grew larger than the Lithuanian base. During this phase, Vinted behaved less like a company expanding and more like a community spreading.

Early Expansion in 2012–2015

In 2012, angel investor Mantas Mikuckas joined and later became COO. With capital and operational focus, Vinted began hiring, setting up community teams, and experimenting with growth.

From 2013 onward, the platform launched in France, Poland, Austria, and the United States, followed by the UK and Spain. Each market required a local approach. In Germany and the Czech Republic, localized branding helped the platform feel native. In France and Poland, being an early entrant into online fashion resale generated press attention and early adoption.

Referral programs played a key role across these launches. Existing users could invite friends and receive small credits, with new users receiving the same benefit. This two-sided incentive turned active users into recruiters. Acquisition costs stayed low because trust already existed inside social circles.

However, not every expansion succeeded. For example in the US market competition was stronger, and resale habits differed. So Vinted eventually pulled focus back to Europe. This restraint mattered. The company learned where its model worked best and avoided forcing growth where signals were weak.

Scaling in 2016–2021

The biggest change in user acquisition came after 2016. Following the business model redesign, Thomas Plantenga pushed for a bold move. Despite tight cash reserves, he argued that broad consumer marketing could unlock network effects at scale.

France became the test case. Vinted invested roughly $800,000 in TV advertising. The message was simple and concrete. You have clothes you do not wear - sell them and earn money. The response was immediate. The experiment worked.

This moment changed how Vinted thought about growth. Over the next years, similar campaigns rolled out in Germany, France, and later the UK. The ads focused on everyday behavior rather than fashion trends. Cleaning closets. Shipping packages. Seeing money arrive. The platform positioned itself as a practical habit, not a niche resale app.

Digital channels followed the same logic. Social media advertising targeted younger audiences on platforms like Instagram and TikTok. By the early 2020s, Vinted was visible across Europe in a way few resale platforms had achieved.

Community-Driven Virality at Scale

Even as paid marketing increased, organic growth did not disappear. It amplified. Users shared earnings stories. Buyers posted outfit hauls. On TikTok, the hashtag #vinted passed 700 million views by 2024. Much of this content was unpaid and informal. Tutorials. Before-and-after wardrobe videos. Tips on flipping items.

Influencer partnerships stayed modest by design. Vinted focused on relatable creators rather than celebrities. The message stayed grounded. Selling clothes was easy. Anyone could do it. That tone reinforced trust and lowered entry barriers.

Marketplace network effects did the rest. Free listings encouraged supply. High supply attracted buyers. Active buyers motivated more people to list. This loop compounded over time. By 2014, Vinted had around three million users. By 2019, the platform passed twenty-three million. In 2021, it reported forty-five million users. By late 2023, the number exceeded one hundred million globally.

France and Germany became core markets. By 2025, Vinted was reported to be the largest clothing retailer in France by transaction volume. 

Acquisitions as Accelerators

User acquisition also came through selective acquisitions. In 2019, Vinted acquired Chicfy to strengthen its position in Spain. In 2020, it bought United Wardrobe, adding roughly four million users across the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. Later acquisitions included Rebelle, focused on luxury resale, and Trendsales in Scandinavia.

Each acquisition followed the same pattern. Bring the community into one platform. Unify the user base.

Core Monetization Strategy

Vinted’s monetization model is the result of trial, error, and changes. The company learned early that fees that feel misaligned with user expectations damage participation. The failed seller commission in 2014 showed this clearly. Users did not see themselves as merchants. Charging them like one broke trust and reduced activity.

After that point, monetization decisions were treated as part of the product design.

Free Core Participation

At the center of the model is a simple rule. Core usage stays free. Listing items costs nothing. Sellers keep the full sale price. This was a structural choice, not a perk.

In a C2C marketplace, many sellers are casual. Even small fees can stop them from listing at all. By removing seller costs, Vinted lowered the threshold for participation and increased supply. More listings improved buyer choice and liquidity. That trade-off proved more valuable than early revenue.

Fees Tied to Clear Value

Revenue comes from services that deliver visible benefit. The main example is the Buyer Protection fee. Buyers pay a small, capped percentage plus a fixed amount at checkout. In return, they get secure payments, fraud handling, and refunds.

The timing matters. Users pay only when a transaction succeeds. The fee appears at the moment value is received, which makes it easier to accept. Sellers benefit indirectly because buyer confidence improves conversion.

Optional Paid Features

Additional monetization is optional. Features like item bumps or wardrobe spotlight help sellers who want faster sales or more exposure. Casual sellers can ignore them and still sell normally. Visibility is never locked behind payment.

This approach avoided backlash. Paid tools feel like shortcuts, not requirements. A small group of active sellers funds the platform without affecting the experience of everyone else.

Trust and Long-Term Growth

Trust investments supported monetization. Better moderation, customer support, and later item verification for luxury goods justified fees by delivering real protection. When users saw value, resistance dropped.

The most important choice was delaying profit in favor of growth. Removing seller fees in 2016 reduced short-term revenue but restored activity. Transaction volume recovered quickly, and revenue followed later. By 2023, Vinted reached profitability without changing its core C2C rules.

Conclusion

Vinted’s business model did not succeed because it was clever. It succeeded because it adapted to how C2C marketplaces actually behave. The company learned, sometimes the hard way, that growth depends on low friction on the supply side and trust on the demand side.

By keeping core participation free, shifting fees to moments of clear value, and treating monetization as part of product design, Vinted avoided the traps that stall many marketplaces.

If you are planning to build a C2C marketplace, or if you are evolving an existing one and want to avoid costly mistakes, this is where experience matters. At Ulan Software, we work with teams building and scaling marketplace platforms, combining product thinking with real-world delivery. If this topic resonates, feel free to reach out and continue the conversation.